The Geopolitical Theater: Trump, NATO, and the Road to 2028
Or: The Unchanging US Strategy to Weaken Russia, Divide Europe, and Contain China
A Familiar Strategy in a Changing World
Let’s begin with an observation that remains stubbornly true despite successive U.S. administrations: the strategic objective of the United States has long been to weaken Russia, keep Europe off-balance, and eventually confront China—the ultimate, though not the only, perceived adversary. This has been the through-line for decades, even as U.S. presidents come and go, alternating between liberal internationalist rhetoric and conservative, nationalist fervor.
I have long argued that only the ideological basis and some strategic and tactical details shift when a new team takes the reins in Washington. Liberal administrations tend to cloak interventions in the language of democracy promotion, humanitarian missions, and, more recently, “rule-based orders,” while conservative ones often champion raw national interest and talk openly about power projections. But if one looks beneath the surface, the end goals align: secure US American hegemony, isolate or undermine potential rivals, and ensure that Europe remains a pliable partner—yet never so strong or united as to challenge U.S. leadership.
This continuity is visible now under the second (current) Trump administration. While its brand of politics is unapologetically nationalist, hawkish, and economically steeped in what might be called techno-feudalist neoliberalism, the overarching designs are not new. Europe is coaxed to spend more on defense, turn inward, and elect far-right parties that are ironically quite pro-NATO, even if they appear hostile to the European Union and NATO on the surface. Russia is the short- to medium-term target, subject to continued attempts at “overextension and unbalancing.” And China looms as the final major competitor that U.S. elites believe must be contained or destabilized to preserve American primacy.
Let’s untangle this geopolitical web more concretely, using a range of sources and evidence. We’ll also explore how these strategies have found fertile ground in Europe’s internal contradictions, why the far-right is ascendant, and how even purportedly “isolationist” moves can actually strengthen U.S. leverage. Finally, we’ll note the critical comments of observers—both official and unofficial—who warn that these policies risk dismantling Europe’s post-1945 peace architecture.
I. The Triple Target: Russia, Europe, and China
Overextending Russia
If you want to trace the consistent strategic goal of the United States toward Russia, it is to keep Moscow perpetually on the defensive. This entails a mix of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, proxy conflicts, and efforts to exploit Russian vulnerabilities (economic, political, and technological).
RAND’s “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” report, for instance, details possible maneuvers aimed at burdening Russian military and economic capacities, with the authors noting that “enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia” (RAND, Overextending Russia, p. 8). The logic is that by provoking or pressuring Russia to overcommit resources along its periphery, the Kremlin will exhaust itself materially or be forced into concessions.
At the same time, new U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth openly calls for higher European defense spending. This, paradoxically, is not true isolationism. It’s an instrument for funneling Europe’s might into the same strategic lines that ultimately benefit Washington. As reported by Lost in EU, Hegseth visited U.S. military bases in Germany and argued that “Trump is right” in demanding 5% of GDP from European nations for defense—a figure that dwarfs previous NATO spending guidelines (Lost in EU, Krieg um die Ukraine: Zwei neue Hardliner bei der NATO).
By increasing tensions with Russia—often couched in moral or humanitarian justifications or more recently in terms of self-protection—Washington ensures that the Kremlin remains encircled, overextended, and locked into a contest of attrition.
Weakening Europe
Europe, for its part, has historically had the capacity to become a rival economic or political pole. But from the American perspective, keeping the continent dependent on U.S. security guarantees (via NATO) is key. Most recently, this means encouraging internal divisions—particularly by backing nationalist politicians who are hostile to Brussels but remain fiercely pro-U.S. in light of Trumpian politics.
Far-Right Ascendancy
Contrary to popular myth, many of Europe’s emergent far-right parties are not anti-NATO at all. Some may flirt with anti-American sentiment in their rhetoric, but ultimately, they prefer the security umbrella of the United States over deeper European integration. As one German-foreign-policy.com report explains, the U.S. fosters direct ties with these parties—through platforms like CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) gatherings in Hungary or think-tank collaborations. The same report details how these right-wing factions are adjusting their stances to become “coalition-capable” by softening the edges of their anti-NATO rhetoric. Indeed, the piece notes that the AfD in Germany has signaled a “a relative rapprochement with the USA” and is “cautiously open” to transatlantic cooperation (german-foreign-policy.com, Auf dem Weg zur Koalitionsfähigkeit). Not to mention Elon Musk’s repeated calls for MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) and the election of the AfD for Germany.Influencing European Elections
After the 1990s, many European governments were led by parties influenced by the liberal wing of the U.S. elite. Yet, ironically, some of these same governments also supported the Yugoslav Wars intervention—thereby aligning with a neoconservative agenda. The early 2000s saw a halfhearted attempt at European sovereignty: the small but significant opposition to the Iraq War (led by France and Germany at the time) was a moment when Europe tried to be more than just a silent partner. However, this flicker of independence soon died down, as European states found themselves enmeshed in NATO’s eastern expansion and reliant on the United States for security, intelligence, and broader global clout.“War in Europe” as a Strategic Objective?
Journalist and commentator Bertrand Arnaud famously wrote on X, “I think we can even legitimately ask ourselves if the U.S. doesn’t now have war in Europe as one of its strategic objectives,” pointing out how supporting nationalist forces in Europe and emphasizing internal enemies effectively “unwinds the entire post-war European peace architecture.” He warns that this approach could have “immense ramifications,” noting that Europe spent the last millennium in nearly constant conflict, and only the post-1945 institutions (like the EU) broke that cycle. By destabilizing or discrediting those institutions, the United States risks plunging Europe back into chaos—albeit in a form that suits American strategy (see Arnaud’s quote in the provided materials and resources).
Preparing for the “End Boss”: China
China looms in the background of virtually all these moves. According to this strategic view:
If Russia is weakened, it cannot effectively align with Beijing.
If Europe is fractured or consumed by crises, it cannot challenge or mediate between the U.S. and China and cannot ally with Russia.
If NATO is repurposed for a global role (beyond its original European scope), it can also contain Chinese influence.
Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 is quite explicit on this point. It talks about transforming NATO so that U.S. allies “field the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia” while the U.S. relies on its nuclear deterrent and specialized capabilities. The text envisions a leaner American presence in Europe precisely so resources can be redirected to other theaters—implicitly Asia and explicitly China (Heritage Foundation, Project 2025).
II. Ideological Shifts: Same End Goals, Different Packaging
One might ask: Why, if the ultimate goals remain the same, have we seen such wild swings in rhetoric from Obama-era liberalism to Trump-era nationalism? The answer lies in what I like to call the “aesthetics” of American hegemony.
The Liberal Aesthetic
Under earlier liberal administrations—Clinton, Obama, and even portions of the post-Bush era—the emphasis was on multilateralism and “democracy promotion.” The messaging was that the United States was building a rule-based order in consultation with allies, safeguarding human rights, etc. But in practice, these ideals frequently served as a cloak for interventions—think of the 1999 Kosovo War, the 2011 intervention in Libya, and the expansions of NATO that followed.
Indeed, Hauke Ritz notes that in the 1990s, Charles Krauthammer and other scholars spoke of a “unipolar moment,” with Washington as the sole decision center. Francis Fukuyama popularized the idea that we had reached the “end of history,” with liberal democracy as the unassailable model. This gave rhetorical cover to a new kind of American hegemony in which, to quote German author Hauke Ritz (in the provided resources), “the U.S. alone dictates the rules everyone else must follow.” The UN Security Council? Largely bypassed. International law? Reinterpreted in favor of “responsibility to protect.” And then “the rules based order.” And so on.
The Conservative Nationalist Aesthetic
Flash forward to the Trump administration, and we see a more raw, unapologetic language of power. Instead of carefully curated diplomatic statements about democracy, there is open talk of deals, expansions, arms races, and the rejection of “globalism.” Yet the underlying program—ensuring the subservience of Europe, the isolation of Russia, and the encirclement of China—persists.
This conservative turn involves an alignment with far-right or nationalist parties across Europe. JD Vance, in a controversial 2025 Munich Security Conference speech, declared that “Europe’s enemies are internal,” effectively endorsing the narrative that the EU is a bureaucratic monstrosity that fails to represent real Europeans against non-EU immigrants. This brand of transatlantic collaboration ironically strengthens NATO’s role, even as it undermines the European Union. The net result? A Europe that invests more in defense and becomes more reliant on American security strategies—precisely the outcome favored by many in Washington’s new circles, whether liberal or conservative in style.
III. Europe’s Ongoing Identity Crisis
One cannot understand why Europe remains so susceptible to Washington’s maneuvers without acknowledging the continent’s internal divisions. Europe’s historical experiences, from the Thirty Years’ War to two World Wars, gave rise to a genuine desire for peace—leading to the EU as a grand experiment in union. But after 1990, the question of how Europe should engage with U.S. power remained unresolved.
The 1990s and Early 2000s: A time of confusion and debate. Some European leaders, notably in France and Germany, wanted strategic independence from the U.S. NATO expansions continued, however, and the fiasco of the Yugoslav Wars pulled Europe closer to American-led interventions. German political scientist Ulrike Guerot remarks that Clinton’s 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia established a model for future operations, with the U.S. as “lawgiver, prosecutor, judge, and police.” Peter Handke was among the few who opposed the demonization campaign against Serbia, but his dissent was swept aside by the broader wave of “information warfare” that portrayed Serbia as the ultimate evil.
Resistance and Submission: In 2003, France and Germany briefly opposed the invasion of Iraq, showing a tiny heartbeat of European sovereignty. Yet this opposition was not institutionally grounded—NATO itself remained intact, and many European nations, especially in Eastern Europe, joined the U.S.-led coalition. As Guerot notes, “Debates remained personal, not embedded in think tanks or foundations.” There was no robust structural mechanism for forging a unified European foreign policy that could stand up to Washington.
The Far-Right Turn: Today, we see parties like the AfD in Germany, Vox in Spain, and others rising to prominence. They claim to challenge the liberal order but often remain open to working with the U.S. on security matters, as indicated in the german-foreign-policy.com reports about the “PfE” (Parties of Europe) forging links with the American right. The result is an odd synergy: these parties rail against “Brussels bureaucracy,” while simultaneously praising the more militaristic demands of Washington.
IV. NATO’s New Hardliners and Plans for 2028-2030
Recent developments at NATO headquarters underscore how little “isolationism” characterizes current U.S. strategy. According to Lost in EU, two new hardliners are calling the shots: U.K. Defence Secretary John Healey, who leads the Ukraine “contact group” (formerly the Ramstein format), and U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who calls for higher European defense spending.
Shifting the Ramstein Format to Brussels
Though it might seem like a bureaucratic detail, the fact that the Ukraine contact group now meets in Brussels instead of the U.S. base at Ramstein signals a deeper institutional shift. The group, under British leadership, aims to coordinate armament deliveries, intelligence sharing, and policy recommendations across NATO. This intensification suggests that the conflict in Ukraine—far from a matter of “strategic fatigue”—is seen as a staging ground for further confrontation with Russia.Forcing Europe’s Hand
Hegseth’s call for 5% of GDP on defense is not modest. It dwarfs even the earlier 2% commitment that many NATO members struggled to meet. Tying this to ongoing conflicts in Europe (like Ukraine) allows Washington to argue that a formidable NATO is essential. But it also ensures that Europe’s resources are directed toward military readiness, leaving fewer funds and less political capital for independent social or economic projects.A Glimpse of 2028
The concept that hostilities with Russia might escalate in or around 2028 is not mere speculation. German Foreign Policy discusses an “Operationsplan Deutschland,” tied to a broader NATO scenario in which 70,000 soldiers from Germany, France, the United States, and others deploy to the Eastern flank. The “Grünbuch ZMZ 4.0” scenario sees a rapid escalation: with Russian troops moving into Kaliningrad and near St. Petersburg, NATO responds by flooding Poland and the Baltics with tens of thousands of troops, using Germany as the logistical hub. If set in motion, this would constitute a near-perfect example of “overextending” Russia—forcing it to respond in multiple theaters, all while draining its economic and military capacity.
V. The Logic of Sending “Peacekeepers” to Ukraine
One hallmark of the current strategic approach is the idea of deploying European “peacekeepers” to Ukraine. On the surface, it sounds like a humanitarian or stabilizing measure. In reality, it can be a way of dragging European forces into direct confrontation with Russia—without automatically activating NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause. If these troops come under attack, this would be an attack on the contingents deployed and Europe alone would carry the brunt of whatever comes next.
By keeping the operation nominally outside the NATO framework, the U.S. can avoid the immediate trigger of a pan-NATO war while still ensuring that Europe bleeds resources and political capital if conflict escalates. Meanwhile, Russia faces a scenario in which it might confront a European force that’s “not quite NATO,” but still linked to Western support structures. This approach effectively merges confrontation and deniability—an ideal situation for a power that wants to test or weaken its adversaries without incurring the cost of a full-scale alliance war.
VI. Beyond Russia: The Shadow of China
Many U.S. planners consider Russia, at best, a near-term threat. The real competitor—where, in game-theory terms, everything comes to a head—is China. While the list of potential U.S. targets might include Greenland, Canada, Panama, and eventually Mexico, it’s China that stands at the apex of American strategic concerns.
Economic Rivalry: China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse and its Belt and Road Initiative challenge U.S. supremacy in global trade and infrastructure investment.
Technological Competition: From 5G to AI, Chinese companies have made inroads that threaten America’s hold on key strategic industries.
Military Modernization: The PLA Navy and its anti-access/area denial capabilities in the Western Pacific are increasingly viewed as formidable obstacles to unfettered U.S. power projection.
Hence, the U.S. sees a need to keep any potential allies of China neutralized or weakened. Russia, if left strong, could serve as a valuable Chinese ally. A united and well-funded Europe might serve as a mediator with Beijing or, worse (from Washington’s viewpoint), become an independent pole that negotiates deals beneficial to its own interests but detrimental to U.S. hegemony.
VII. Think Tanks, Regime Change, and the Evolving U.S.-Europe Relationship
A crucial element in shaping these policies is the network of think tanks and transatlantic organizations that connect conservative factions in the U.S. to their European counterparts. Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, for example, explicitly outlines scenarios in which Europe should handle most conventional deterrence in order to free up U.S. resources. Another thread is the push from some factions for “regime change” in Europe—installing governments more aligned with Washington’s objectives. This is being accomplished via:
Direct Intellectual Influence: Hosting European politicians at events like CPAC Hungary, or in Washington at the Heritage Foundation.
Media and Social Platforms: Partnerships with tech magnates who share conservative or libertarian values, influencing discourse in Europe.
Formal Invitations and Networking: As german-foreign-policy.com notes, some European far-right delegations were the only ones invited to key ceremonies in Washington, signifying special favor.
Once these ties are formed, the ideological shift in Europe becomes self-sustaining: parties realize they can gain traction by tapping into anti-EU sentiment while also pledging loyalty to NATO and the broader American-led security agenda.
VIII. A European Perspective
On the dissolution of the USSR and the dawn of the so-called unipolar moment, the U.S. moved quickly to establish a global order in which it alone writes the rules. Quoting Ritz:
“Charles Krauthammer … describes the world as unipolar, saying there is only one decision-making center: Washington. … We don’t need the UN Security Council anymore. The U.S. essentially anticipates what today is called the international hegemony of the U.S. ... The U.S. alone dictates the rules everyone else must follow.”
Much of Europe’s complicity stems from a post-Cold War context in which Europeans were not prepared—mentally or institutionally—to articulate a fully independent global vision. By the time of the Yugoslav Wars in the late 1990s, the U.S. had already set the precedent for bypassing international law. Europe, lacking unified think tanks or strong political will, largely went along with it.
This pattern continues to this day, reflected in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the fact that many European leaders, despite initial hesitations, eventually lined up behind Washington’s approach and will do so with the Trump administration. In essence, this is a logical outgrowth of the “Pax Americana” worldview, where no competing modernity—be it European, Chinese, or Indian—is fully tolerated.
IX. The Heartland Theory and the Failure of the American “Experiment” in Ukraine
The “Heartland Theory” is an interesting dimension reminiscent of Halford Mackinder’s classic geopolitics. With this lens, we can sense how Ukraine has become a central stage for projecting U.S. power deeper into Eurasia, effectively bridging the geographical gap into Eastern Europe. Yet, as the conflict drags on, it becomes apparent that this experiment—treating Ukraine as a de facto headquarters for American strategic interests—may be failing.
The reason? The deeper structural tensions remain:
Europe does not fully embrace U.S. leadership, but it also lacks the fortitude to declare real independence.
Russia, though weakened, is not backing down.
China watches from the sidelines, potentially benefiting from cheaper Russian energy and an opportunity to learn from Western mistakes.
The chaos in Ukraine might spur new waves of refugees, economic dislocation, and political backlash in Europe, exacerbating divisions.
If the U.S. intended Ukraine to be a neat demonstration of unipolar power, the outcome is messy at best. Yet, ironically, the continued instability can still serve the broader aim of stalling Russia’s resurgence. So, from a purely realpolitik angle, the turmoil might be seen in Washington as “useful,” even if it’s disastrous for Ukrainians and highly destabilizing for Europe.
X. Why Europe Struggles to Break Free
The question arises: If Europe perceives these maneuvers—if it senses that Washington’s main objective is to keep the EU divided and militarily entangled—why does it not chart its own course?
Historical Trauma: Europe’s repeated wars have left a deep fear of conflict. Many Europeans still see NATO as the ultimate guarantee against potential aggression, whether from Russia or elsewhere.
Lack of Unity: The EU is not a monolith but an amalgamation of states with diverse interests. Eastern European countries often prioritize security against Russia above all else. Some Southern states worry more about economic crises and migration issues. Western powers like France and Germany have their own strategic cultures but rarely align perfectly.
Dependency on U.S. Technology and Markets: American dominance in tech, finance, and even cultural spheres (media, entertainment) means that any attempt by Europe to decouple from the U.S. would be extremely costly.
Far-Right Erosion of Integration: As the far-right gains strength—some of it openly championed by American conservatives—any EU reforms that might create a robust, autonomous security framework become more difficult to implement.
Thus, even though many Europeans may resent the current approach, no coherent alternative has taken shape on the continent. The old dream of an independent “European Army” or a genuinely sovereign foreign policy, whether as a united Europe or within the European nation-states, remains more aspiration than reality.
XI. Looking Ahead: Road to 2028—and Beyond
We now come to the question: Why 2028? In some planning documents, that date surfaces as a tipping point—a potential moment when a conflict with Russia could escalate or certain NATO readiness goals must be met. Whether or not a full-blown conflict materializes, the trajectory is clear:
NATO is beefing up in Eastern Europe.
Europe’s defense budgets are on the rise.
The U.S. strategy of “overextending” Russia via Ukraine and other pressure points continues.
China remains the ultimate concern, and any consolidation of Russian or European power would be detrimental to U.S. designs in Asia.
Ultimately, it might sound hyperbolic, but the deeper logic is that the United States has historically intervened when its interests are perceived to be at stake. Those interests can be defined quite expansively.
XII. Concluding Reflections: Europe’s Crossroads
In closing, one cannot help but reflect on whether Europe has the political will to extricate itself from this cycle. Will the continent remain a pawn in a broader American strategy—caught between a desire for peace and the demands of militarization? Or can it rediscover a more independent path, grounded in the original spirit of its post-1945 institutions, which were meant to end the centuries-long cycle of European wars?
By aligning with nationalist forces and undermining European unity, the United States isn’t just ending an alliance—it’s actively working to unwind the entire post-war European peace architecture. If that architecture unravels, the next step may well be a renewed cycle of conflict on the continent, this time with far deadlier technology and more destabilizing global consequences.
We see that “Trump-era” policies—far from being isolationist—are forging deeper military commitments, higher spending, and a readiness posture that might portend a future clash. This is not purely the domain of the conservative ideologues in power; it’s a structural feature of American foreign policy that persists whether Republicans or Democrats hold office. And it’s the structural features of an empire in decline that only acts on instinct for survival like a drowning man at sea. As some have put it, the difference lies mainly in how they sell it to the public and spin it to allies.
The pattern is set, whether 2028 will be the year this strategy climaxes or extends further into the future. European leaders, aware of this dynamic, face a stark choice: acquiesce to the logic of endless militarization and external manipulation or strive for genuine sovereignty that might eventually risk a real break with Washington and its militaristic logic. So far, they seem reluctant to pick a firm side, oscillating between half-hearted sovereignty and reflexive obedience to the transatlantic line.
Should that continue, the uneasy equilibrium will hold—until a crisis breaks it. And if that crisis takes the form of a major conflict, one can only hope it does not shatter the peace Europe has known since 1945. Nor shatter the world as a whole.
Closing Note
All of these moves—increasing European military budgets, deploying American troops to Germany and Poland, funneling far-right sentiment into anti-EU but pro-NATO stances, overextending Russia, and eyeing China’s global ambitions—fit into a single tapestry: the preservation of U.S. dominance. The rhetorical flourish may change, and the ideological justifications may oscillate between liberal “rule-based order” and conservative “America First,” yet the strategic bedrock remains.
It falls to Europeans—and indeed to anyone and any nation who values a multipolar or more balanced international system—to recognize these patterns and decide whether to remain passengers on a train racing toward a showdown or to try forging new paths to genuine autonomy, peace, and cooperation. If Europe truly wants to avoid the next great conflict on its soil, it must sooner or later grapple with the burdens of forging its own destiny—rather than letting Washington’s designs dictate it.
Resources and Selected Quotations (as provided or cited in the text)
Bertrand Arnaud on X:
“Perhaps most worrying of all, Vance’s vision seems to completely disregard why the post-WW2 European architecture was built in the first place … By positioning America as an ally of nationalist forces against these institutions, Vance isn’t just ending an alliance—he’s actively working to unwind the entire post-war European peace architecture … I think we can even legitimately ask ourselves if the U.S. doesn’t now have war in Europe as one of its strategic objectives.”
Lost in EU, “Krieg um die Ukraine: Zwei neue Hardliner bei der NATO”
“…Trump habe ‘Recht’, wenn er Verteidigungs-Investitionen von fünf Prozent des Bruttoinlandsproduktes (BIP) von den Europäern fordere, sagte der neue Pentagonchef … die Nato müsse ‘eine stärkere, tödlichere Kraft sein – kein diplomatischer Club’.”
German Foreign Policy, “Operationsplan Deutschland”
“Mehrere große NATO-Staaten, darunter … die USA, mindestens 70.000 Soldaten über deutsches Territorium nach Osten verlegen … So verlegt die Bundeswehr – verstärkt durch Einheiten aus den Niederlanden, Kroatien und Norwegen – rund 30.000 Soldaten nach Litauen. … Die Vereinigten Staaten entsenden 25.000 … nach Polen …”
German Foreign Policy, “Auf dem Weg zur Koalitionsfähigkeit”
“Am Freitagabend trafen führende Vertreter der PfE am Rande der PfE-Generalversammlung in Madrid mit Kevin Roberts zusammen. Roberts ist Präsident der Heritage Foundation … Einen weiteren Schub für den Ausbau der Beziehungen … wird Ende Mai die nächste CPAC Hungary bringen.”
RAND, “Extending and Unbalancing Russia”
“…enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities … might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia, as a way of hedging against the chance of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.”
Heritage Foundation, “Project 2025”
“Transform NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia … while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.”
Hauke Ritz & Ulrike Guerot (European Citizen Radio), “Die amerikanische Tragödie”
“…The U.S. essentially anticipates what today is called the international hegemony of the U.S. … The U.S. alone dictates the rules everyone else must follow … The shock of September 11 enabled them to execute plans outlined in the Weekly Standard magazine since ’97, promoting aggressive American foreign policy … No competitor should arise. Preventive action must be taken against rising powers…”
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