Synchronized defense budgets, shared doctrines, and welfare cuts expose the fiction of a 'rift'—while citizens foot the bill for perpetual war readiness.
Excellent analysis. I found the observations on Merz's advisers and speeches informative. I agree the marriage holds at the strategic, political elite level and it is premised on Europe serving USA global power. I wonder though if the sociocultural differences will not drive a deeper split over time. It will drive splits in society, and Trump's crassness gives people the excuse to break the American spell. The routine contempt of US elites across the spectrum towards Europe - which reminds me of the attitudes of the British Raj - may also provoke breakaway elites. Especially if there is a cascade of disasters from US elites bad deciaion making and failed war on China. Thanks for the food for thought.
Thank you—glad the piece was useful as food for thought!
I’m less confident, though, that sociocultural divergences will push Europe out of Washington’s orbit any time soon:
Nationalism can cut both ways. A CDU-style or AfD-style nationalism is far more likely to present itself as the reliable U.S. partner (“strong borders, strong defense, stand with the West”) than as a Gaullist bid for autonomy. The brother-in-arms narrative travels well on the right.
The public doesn’t yet see the convergence. Most Germans still interpret foreign policy through energy prices and holiday travel, not grand strategy. Elite alignment remains largely invisible, blunting mass pushback.
Anti-U.S. sentiment ≠ strategic rupture. Even if Trump’s crassness offends, it may fuel a “we need to spend more so we’re taken seriously in Washington” reflex rather than a call to chart an independent course.
That said, I agree that cracks could widen if U.S. decision-making produces spectacular failures, especially a botched confrontation with China that drags Europeans into an economic tailspin. But absent that level of shock, the centrifugal sociocultural forces look weaker to me than the centripetal logic of shared interests, supply chains, and decades-old security habits.
Now, the European elites and their subordination to the Trump administration...I would say this is more like capitalist class solidarity across borders: a shared worldview among political-managerial elites that outweighs any felt obligation to protect national sovereignty or voters’ material welfare (I just need to remember Merz and his comments on anything related to the economy and workers' rights). How else could this be explained? After all, Western democracies have slowly ceased to be democratic and have descended into oligarchies. They are in the process of becoming such entities in the near future if they aren't already.
This is very wise. What you say about Euro elites saying “we need to spend more so we’re taken seriously in Washington” is exactly what I have observed in Australia over the last 10 years. Worried about US withdrawal, the 'sub-imperial elites' say we will be model allies. I think the tipping point will come after undeniable US defeat, which I see coming in Ukraine, China and more uncertaintly in West Asia. Even the loyalest allies don't like to hang out with a loser. They will start listening then to all the advice they will be getting that they can defend themselves better with diplomacy not US wonder-weapons.
I tend to agree that only a first-order shock such as an unmistakable U.S. defeat, could jolt allied capitals out of the current reflex to “buy relevance” with bigger weapons budgets. But I’m not convinced the present crop of European or Allied decision-makers would pivot even then. Most have been socialised for decades in the same trans-Atlantic training loops. In other words, the problem is less the outcome of this or that war than the personnel pipeline that keeps reproducing a worldview almost indistinguishable from Washington’s.
Real change, in my view, would additionally require a new leadership cohort that is not embedded in those structures and that’s not merely a geopolitical shift. I’m sketching some thoughts on this “convergence of thinking” for another piece right now; the deeper I dig, the more I see how epistemic networks (who you study with, whose conferences you attend, which think-tank pays your airfare) hard-wire policy and worldview orientation frameworks.
So yes: catastrophe could be the catalyst, but only if it coincides with or accelerates a turnover in the elite stratum itself.
Indeed. I had thought that only the MIC alliance would be bad for Europe, while the rift would be real otherwise. In retrospect, the implications are larger and deeper. Can I paraphrase your ideas as: Trump may not like the current crop of European leaders. However, the deep-staters in all these countries are still in control, and much more so in Europe than in the US. Adding the multi-national companies and the super-rich. Their business interests are also more aligned than the discord between Trump and his European counterparts.
I usually argue that national defense is the number one, if not the only job, for a national government. But in the case of the US and many European nations, national defense is but an excuse for uncontrolled and unaudited money flow into private pockets. I wonder if the US and the European nations should nationalize the MIC (if that dream can be realized at all). Military spending and waste will remain mostly unchanged, but now they are nominally under the umbrella of the executive branch of the government and subject to the usual internal accounting and inspection. At least, the government cannot use business interests or shareholder payback as excuses. Taking MIC into national government removes one layer of middlemen and a bunch of shareholders.
Great commentary: let me try to unpack it piece by piece.
Is the “rift” only theatrical? You’re right that personal friction (Trump vs. Macron, Merz, Starmer etc.) hasn’t disrupted the deeper mesh of interests that binds Washington and European capitals.
That mesh is produced by:
Permanent bureaucracies (defense, finance, intel) that survive electoral swings;
Trans-Atlantic think-tank circuits that write the talking points;
Multinationals and large asset managers whose portfolios straddle both sides of the ocean.
So yes: the same “deep-state + C-suite” bloc remains ascendant in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and to a degree even under a Trump White House.
I’d go a step further. Western corporations aren’t merely protecting current profits; many fear they cannot win a fair industrial race against a state-coordinated Chinese economy. When market supremacy feels unattainable, the incentive shifts to regulatory, financial, or military pressure on the rival. That’s why talk of “de-risking” so quickly morphs into sanctions regimes, tech-export bans, and forward deployments.
Would outright nationalization fix the Military-Industrial Complex? I do not think so, because:
De facto nationalization already exists. R&D, risk, and most capital expenditures are taxpayer-funded; the “private” contractors earn regulated profit margins. It’s public money with a shareholder skim on top.
Militarism is driven by state strategy as much as by private profit. A fully state-owned MIC could still be directed toward power projection if the political class sees that as essential to preserving hegemony.
Information asymmetry and threat inflation don’t vanish in a state company. The same generals and lobbyists would write the specs and threat assessments.
In short, nationalization might trim shareholder dividends, but it wouldn’t remove the geostrategic incentive to treat military spending as an insurance policy for fading economic primacy.
The MIC is already quasi-nationalized; militarism flows less from private ownership than from a ruling (corporate and state-based) coalition that sees force as the shortcut to preserving a slipping economic order. Changing ownership without changing that strategic mindset risks swapping shareholders for commissars while the spending curve (and dangers) keep climbing.
The rearmament of Germany sends shivers down my spine - and so should all Europeans. But the European elites cling to their transatlantic umbilical cord, no matter how condescendingly the Americans treat them. They are so thick-skinned that they stand upright without a spine. Rearmament is now being sold as an economic rescue for Germany. The war memories only remain as unconditional defense of Israel. NATO propaganda seems to be able to remove the last remnants of anti-war resistance. This will not end well.
This, too, strikes me as weird: It is the almost reflexive loyalty many European leaders show toward their U.S. counterparts—even when the policies on offer damage Europe’s own economies (and may cost much more down the line).
At that point, it begins to look less like “Atlantic partnership” and more like capitalist class solidarity across borders: a shared worldview among political-managerial elites that outweighs any felt obligation to protect national sovereignty or voters’ material welfare. How else could this be explained? After all, Western democracies have ceased to be democratic and have descended into oligarchies.
Sure, it is "Atlantic Elite Partnership". Point is even if Trump tries to 'drain the swamp' this does not extend to the MIC. On the European side the elites still are in control and cling to the military alliance at any cost. European elites are so brain-washed they are unable to conceive the US as an enemy. It goes back to FDR America and the US helping liberate Western Europe from the Nazis. Even the US annexing Canada and occupying Greenland will be swollowed and explained as necessary for the common interest.
The "capitalist class solidarity" exists on the Pacific side as well. However, the solidarity there is weaker, perhaps due to stronger nationalism. At one point, even the Chinese communist party and the American capitalists were in close alliance. Xi's purge among the business leaders had something to do with that. Given the US trade/tariff war, even factions against Xi inside the CCP have to think twice about their future alliance with their former business partners. Tim Cook had always been treated like a president, but he switched to the "made in India" strategy since the first low-priced iPhone several years ago, if not earlier. Continued effort by China to keep him attached is a failure during this brief trade/tariff war (in a brief intermission right now).
Excellent analysis! A powerful reminder that the only way to properly understand current events is to“follow the policy.” Follow the policy development process, read the “outputs” of the Think Tanks, listen to the congressional committee hearings, and monitor your blood pressure as you read Foreign Affairs with its reeking undertones of moral righteousness, unbridled supremacy, and manifest destiny. It’s not hard to do. You don’t even need Wikileaks to publish a National Security Council memorandum or diplomatic cable to enlighten you. It’s in plain sight, and studiously ignored by the Western stenographers masquerading as journalists.
Thank you, Michael. I’m glad the piece resonated. I’m often struck by how little “detective work” is actually required: most of the playbook is sitting in open‐source PDFs and C-SPAN archives, gathering digital dust. The gap is between published-but-unread. Once you start treating think-tank white papers and committee hearings as primary sources, the goals become depressingly transparent.
The description of the elite knowledge networks sounds exotic, unique and all powerful, when, in simple speak, its common sense and can be overcome by simply challenging their right to exist.
Excellent analysis. I found the observations on Merz's advisers and speeches informative. I agree the marriage holds at the strategic, political elite level and it is premised on Europe serving USA global power. I wonder though if the sociocultural differences will not drive a deeper split over time. It will drive splits in society, and Trump's crassness gives people the excuse to break the American spell. The routine contempt of US elites across the spectrum towards Europe - which reminds me of the attitudes of the British Raj - may also provoke breakaway elites. Especially if there is a cascade of disasters from US elites bad deciaion making and failed war on China. Thanks for the food for thought.
Thank you—glad the piece was useful as food for thought!
I’m less confident, though, that sociocultural divergences will push Europe out of Washington’s orbit any time soon:
Nationalism can cut both ways. A CDU-style or AfD-style nationalism is far more likely to present itself as the reliable U.S. partner (“strong borders, strong defense, stand with the West”) than as a Gaullist bid for autonomy. The brother-in-arms narrative travels well on the right.
The public doesn’t yet see the convergence. Most Germans still interpret foreign policy through energy prices and holiday travel, not grand strategy. Elite alignment remains largely invisible, blunting mass pushback.
Anti-U.S. sentiment ≠ strategic rupture. Even if Trump’s crassness offends, it may fuel a “we need to spend more so we’re taken seriously in Washington” reflex rather than a call to chart an independent course.
That said, I agree that cracks could widen if U.S. decision-making produces spectacular failures, especially a botched confrontation with China that drags Europeans into an economic tailspin. But absent that level of shock, the centrifugal sociocultural forces look weaker to me than the centripetal logic of shared interests, supply chains, and decades-old security habits.
Now, the European elites and their subordination to the Trump administration...I would say this is more like capitalist class solidarity across borders: a shared worldview among political-managerial elites that outweighs any felt obligation to protect national sovereignty or voters’ material welfare (I just need to remember Merz and his comments on anything related to the economy and workers' rights). How else could this be explained? After all, Western democracies have slowly ceased to be democratic and have descended into oligarchies. They are in the process of becoming such entities in the near future if they aren't already.
Curious to hear where you see the tipping point.
This is very wise. What you say about Euro elites saying “we need to spend more so we’re taken seriously in Washington” is exactly what I have observed in Australia over the last 10 years. Worried about US withdrawal, the 'sub-imperial elites' say we will be model allies. I think the tipping point will come after undeniable US defeat, which I see coming in Ukraine, China and more uncertaintly in West Asia. Even the loyalest allies don't like to hang out with a loser. They will start listening then to all the advice they will be getting that they can defend themselves better with diplomacy not US wonder-weapons.
I tend to agree that only a first-order shock such as an unmistakable U.S. defeat, could jolt allied capitals out of the current reflex to “buy relevance” with bigger weapons budgets. But I’m not convinced the present crop of European or Allied decision-makers would pivot even then. Most have been socialised for decades in the same trans-Atlantic training loops. In other words, the problem is less the outcome of this or that war than the personnel pipeline that keeps reproducing a worldview almost indistinguishable from Washington’s.
Real change, in my view, would additionally require a new leadership cohort that is not embedded in those structures and that’s not merely a geopolitical shift. I’m sketching some thoughts on this “convergence of thinking” for another piece right now; the deeper I dig, the more I see how epistemic networks (who you study with, whose conferences you attend, which think-tank pays your airfare) hard-wire policy and worldview orientation frameworks.
So yes: catastrophe could be the catalyst, but only if it coincides with or accelerates a turnover in the elite stratum itself.
Indeed. I had thought that only the MIC alliance would be bad for Europe, while the rift would be real otherwise. In retrospect, the implications are larger and deeper. Can I paraphrase your ideas as: Trump may not like the current crop of European leaders. However, the deep-staters in all these countries are still in control, and much more so in Europe than in the US. Adding the multi-national companies and the super-rich. Their business interests are also more aligned than the discord between Trump and his European counterparts.
I usually argue that national defense is the number one, if not the only job, for a national government. But in the case of the US and many European nations, national defense is but an excuse for uncontrolled and unaudited money flow into private pockets. I wonder if the US and the European nations should nationalize the MIC (if that dream can be realized at all). Military spending and waste will remain mostly unchanged, but now they are nominally under the umbrella of the executive branch of the government and subject to the usual internal accounting and inspection. At least, the government cannot use business interests or shareholder payback as excuses. Taking MIC into national government removes one layer of middlemen and a bunch of shareholders.
Great commentary: let me try to unpack it piece by piece.
Is the “rift” only theatrical? You’re right that personal friction (Trump vs. Macron, Merz, Starmer etc.) hasn’t disrupted the deeper mesh of interests that binds Washington and European capitals.
That mesh is produced by:
Permanent bureaucracies (defense, finance, intel) that survive electoral swings;
Trans-Atlantic think-tank circuits that write the talking points;
Multinationals and large asset managers whose portfolios straddle both sides of the ocean.
So yes: the same “deep-state + C-suite” bloc remains ascendant in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and to a degree even under a Trump White House.
I’d go a step further. Western corporations aren’t merely protecting current profits; many fear they cannot win a fair industrial race against a state-coordinated Chinese economy. When market supremacy feels unattainable, the incentive shifts to regulatory, financial, or military pressure on the rival. That’s why talk of “de-risking” so quickly morphs into sanctions regimes, tech-export bans, and forward deployments.
Would outright nationalization fix the Military-Industrial Complex? I do not think so, because:
De facto nationalization already exists. R&D, risk, and most capital expenditures are taxpayer-funded; the “private” contractors earn regulated profit margins. It’s public money with a shareholder skim on top.
Militarism is driven by state strategy as much as by private profit. A fully state-owned MIC could still be directed toward power projection if the political class sees that as essential to preserving hegemony.
Information asymmetry and threat inflation don’t vanish in a state company. The same generals and lobbyists would write the specs and threat assessments.
In short, nationalization might trim shareholder dividends, but it wouldn’t remove the geostrategic incentive to treat military spending as an insurance policy for fading economic primacy.
The MIC is already quasi-nationalized; militarism flows less from private ownership than from a ruling (corporate and state-based) coalition that sees force as the shortcut to preserving a slipping economic order. Changing ownership without changing that strategic mindset risks swapping shareholders for commissars while the spending curve (and dangers) keep climbing.
The rearmament of Germany sends shivers down my spine - and so should all Europeans. But the European elites cling to their transatlantic umbilical cord, no matter how condescendingly the Americans treat them. They are so thick-skinned that they stand upright without a spine. Rearmament is now being sold as an economic rescue for Germany. The war memories only remain as unconditional defense of Israel. NATO propaganda seems to be able to remove the last remnants of anti-war resistance. This will not end well.
This, too, strikes me as weird: It is the almost reflexive loyalty many European leaders show toward their U.S. counterparts—even when the policies on offer damage Europe’s own economies (and may cost much more down the line).
At that point, it begins to look less like “Atlantic partnership” and more like capitalist class solidarity across borders: a shared worldview among political-managerial elites that outweighs any felt obligation to protect national sovereignty or voters’ material welfare. How else could this be explained? After all, Western democracies have ceased to be democratic and have descended into oligarchies.
Sure, it is "Atlantic Elite Partnership". Point is even if Trump tries to 'drain the swamp' this does not extend to the MIC. On the European side the elites still are in control and cling to the military alliance at any cost. European elites are so brain-washed they are unable to conceive the US as an enemy. It goes back to FDR America and the US helping liberate Western Europe from the Nazis. Even the US annexing Canada and occupying Greenland will be swollowed and explained as necessary for the common interest.
The "capitalist class solidarity" exists on the Pacific side as well. However, the solidarity there is weaker, perhaps due to stronger nationalism. At one point, even the Chinese communist party and the American capitalists were in close alliance. Xi's purge among the business leaders had something to do with that. Given the US trade/tariff war, even factions against Xi inside the CCP have to think twice about their future alliance with their former business partners. Tim Cook had always been treated like a president, but he switched to the "made in India" strategy since the first low-priced iPhone several years ago, if not earlier. Continued effort by China to keep him attached is a failure during this brief trade/tariff war (in a brief intermission right now).
Excellent analysis! A powerful reminder that the only way to properly understand current events is to“follow the policy.” Follow the policy development process, read the “outputs” of the Think Tanks, listen to the congressional committee hearings, and monitor your blood pressure as you read Foreign Affairs with its reeking undertones of moral righteousness, unbridled supremacy, and manifest destiny. It’s not hard to do. You don’t even need Wikileaks to publish a National Security Council memorandum or diplomatic cable to enlighten you. It’s in plain sight, and studiously ignored by the Western stenographers masquerading as journalists.
Thank you, Michael. I’m glad the piece resonated. I’m often struck by how little “detective work” is actually required: most of the playbook is sitting in open‐source PDFs and C-SPAN archives, gathering digital dust. The gap is between published-but-unread. Once you start treating think-tank white papers and committee hearings as primary sources, the goals become depressingly transparent.
The description of the elite knowledge networks sounds exotic, unique and all powerful, when, in simple speak, its common sense and can be overcome by simply challenging their right to exist.